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The “contagion effect” . . . was thought to be a very common 
occurrence by almost all the market participants interviewed. 
It was attributed by many either to demonstration effects 
arising from the reassessment of the value of the totality of 
emerging market paper in light of the information highlighted 
by  the particular characteristics of the crisis in one country, or 
to technicalities of the portfolio management methods used 
by many investors or fund managers. 
-Group  of Ten (1996, 33) 
1.1  Introduction 
One of the most puzzling features of the recent balance-of-payments 
crises has been the simultaneous collapse of securities markets at regional 
and global levels. In the case of Mexico’s 1994 crash this phenomenon was 
named the tequila effect: As the crisis in Mexico surged, investors reduced 
their exposure both in markets of vulnerable countries like Argentina and 
Brazil, and in countries widely believed to be more stable, like Chile or 
Singapore. All of these countries had few, if any, economic linkages with 
Mexico. Similarly, the Russian default and the collapse of the ruble in 
October 1988 had major ramifications for equity markets worldwide, in- 
cluding a major “run for quality” in the U.S.  stock market, despite the 
small share of world output that Russia accounts for and its very limited 
economic linkages with the United States. This behavior seems indicative 
of  contagion by  global investors: Equity positions and prices displayed 
major shifts that were not related to market “fundamentals.”  ’ 
The recent crises have led observers and some policy makers to con- 
clude that along with the efficiency gains resulting from the unprecedented 
globalization that securities markets have attained also came a high degree 
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of volatility of private capital flows. In light of this increased volatility, 
countries have resorted in some instances to the introduction of controver- 
sial capital controls, taxes, and other barriers to asset trading (see, e.g., 
Chile’s taxes and timing restrictions on short-term capital flows, and the 
more drastic controls introduced in Malaysia in  1997). All these barriers 
were judged traditionally as major policy flaws, but they are gaining in- 
creasing popularity in the wake of the recent crises. This need to respond 
quickly to a critical situation, however, contrasts sharply with our very 
limited understanding of the mechanisms that may drive contagion, of the 
quantitative significance of this phenomenon, and of the kind of policies 
that can be effective to prevent it. 
The urgent question at hand is this: Is there a tendency for larger, or 
globalized, securities markets to become more volatile, or more suscep- 
tible to contagion, as globalization progresses? More precisely, are there 
mechanisms that lead investors to be influenced by  contagion that grow 
stronger with globalization? This paper aims to answer these questions by 
showing that contagion is an outcome of optimal portfolio diversification 
that can become more pervasive as securities markets  grow. We  define 
contagion as a situation in which investors optimally choose to react to a 
rumor regarding a country’s asset return characteristics, or to mimic the 
perceived optimal portfolio share assigned to a particular country by  an 
arbitrary “market” portfolio. 
Our analysis illustrates how two characteristics of imperfect informa- 
tion produce equilibria in which mean-variance portfolio optimizers are 
more likely to exhibit contagion as capital markets grow.2 First, if there is 
a fixed cost ,of gathering and processing country-specific information, the 
expected utility gain made by paying this cost generally falls as the number 
of countries where wealth can be invested grows. Portfolios also become 
more sensitive to changes in perceived asset returns as markets grow, and 
thus contagion is more likely to prevail and to produce larger capital flows 
in globalized markets. Second, if investors (or fund managers) bear vari- 
able costs that depend on the performance of their portfolios-in  particu- 
lar, if the marginal cost of producing a mean return lower than the market 
exceeds the marginal gain of beating the market-there  is a “contagion 
range” within which investors rationally choose to mimic arbitrary “mar- 
ket” portfolios. Globalization works to widen this contagion range. 
Information frictions have been widely used in the extensive literature 
2. The model does not differentiate global markets from domestic markets. We  believe, 
however, that information frictions are more pervasive in global markets. This assumption 
is supported by  some empirical regularities documented later in the paper and is also in line 
with the elaborate warnings that mutual funds give investors to highlight the special risks of 
global investing (see, e.g., Franklin Partners Funds, Prospectus,  1 May 1996, p.  13), particu- 
larly, sudden currency collapses, differing legal and accounting practices, and unanticipated 
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on contagion and herding in financial markets. To date, however, the inter- 
action between the distortions generated by information frictions and the 
size of financial markets has remain largely unexplored. Thus, we  begin 
by exploring analytically what conditions are required for the growth of 
securities markets to have the perverse effect of enlarging the information 
frictions that induce contagion. In addition, since the magnitude of the 
actual shifts in  portfolio allocations that  contagion may induce is  also 
largely unknown,  we  examine the model’s quantitative implications  by 
conducting some basic numerical simulations. 
Our quantitative analysis is based on a version of the model calibrated 
to capture key  stylized facts of historical data from equity markets and 
country credit ratings (CCRs). Equity-market measures of the mean and 
variance of country asset returns are viewed as free information, while the 
information embodied in CCRs is assumed to be costly. These CCRs are 
very stable for industrialized and least-developed countries, while the rat- 
ings of  emerging economies are very volatile, suggesting that historical 
equity-market data are significantly less useful for predicting future asset 
returns in emerging economies than in industrialized countries. 
The numerical exploration suggests that the model can generate large 
capital flows driven by  contagion. If the block of emerging economies is 
viewed as a segmented market, we found that investors will not assess the 
veracity of country-specific rumors if fixed information costs exceed one- 
sixth of the mean portfolio return prior to the emergence of a rumor. The 
full adverse effect of globalization on information gains is transmitted with 
about a dozen countries. The contagion range predicted by  a rough pa- 
rameterization  ,of variable costs that  depend  on portfolio performance 
measures about 2.5 percentage points, even for small total costs. Simula- 
tions applied to Mexican data suggest that the model can rationalize capi- 
tal outflows in excess of $15 billion triggered by contagion. 
Keynes’s (1936) classic analysis of speculation, which he defined as “the 
activity of forecasting the psychology of the market,” anticipated our work 
in predicting that speculation can be more pervasive in larger or better 
organized markets. He also proposed other mechanisms that could drive 
speculation-sudden  changes of opinion driven by mass psychology, per- 
verse incentives of professional investors induced by information or repu- 
tational  and changes in the confidence of lenders that finance spec- 
ulators. These mechanisms have been the focus of the modern literature 
on herd behavior, which has made notable progress in providing the micro- 
foundations of  contagion and in justifying the information and reputa- 
tional costs that we  take for granted in this paper (see, e.g., Scharfstein 
3. Keynes (1936, 157) wrote: “Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so 
difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must surely lead much more 
laborious days and run greater risks than he who tries to guess better than the crowd how 
the crowd will behave. . . .” 18  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
and Stein  1990; Bikhchandani,  Hirshleifer, and Welch  1992; Banerjee 
1992; and Morris and Shing 1995). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 analyzes the 
relationship  between herd  behavior  and the globalization  of  securities 
markets. Section 1.3 examines the quantitative implications of the anal- 
ysis. Section 1.4 concludes with a discussion of normative issues. 
1.2  Optimal Global Portfolio Diversification with Contagion 
The presentation that follows is a less technical version of that found in 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000a). We have omitted proofs and focused instead 
on developing the intuition. Consider a globalized securities market con- 
sisting of J  countries, for 2 s J s 00, and a large number of identical 
investors. Wealth is normalized to 1 for simplicity. The representative in- 
vestor must choose a portfolio to be divided between a “world fund” of 
J - 1 identical countries and a single country (country  i).  Each of the 
J -  1 countries in the world fund pays an independent and identical nor- 
mally distributed stochastic return with mean p and variance a:.  The re- 
turn of country i also follows a normal distribution, but with mean Y* and 
variance IT;,  that will generally differ from those of the world fund, and 
with a correlation with the world fund determined by the correlation co- 
efficient q.  Since all J - 1 countries in the world fund are identical, in 
equilibrium the share of the portfolio invested in each of these countries 
is identical. Hence, the relevant choice is between the fraction of the inves- 
tor’s wealth allocated  to the world fund, defined as 8, and the fraction 
allocated Fo  country i, 1 -  8. 
The investor sets 8 so as to maximize the following indirect expected 
utility function: 
(1)  mye) =  k(8) - ‘o(o)~ - K - A[~(o)  - rJ.(~>l, 
where y is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; k and u are the mean 
and standard deviation of the return for a particular portfolio 8. The mod- 
el’s information frictions are introduced by the costs reflected in K and A: 
K is a fixed cost of acquiring country-specific information and A is a vari- 
able cost (benefit) resulting from obtaining a mean return lower (higher) 
than that  of an arbitrary “market” portfolio 0.  This variable cost can 
be interpreted as a reputational cost or as an incentive scheme for fund 
managers. We show below that these information frictions strengthen in- 
centives for contagion as the global market grows (i.e., as J rises). 
1.2.1 
The investor can acquire and process country-specific information at 
the fixed cost K to update the estimates of the mean and variance of coun- 
y,K  > 0,  2 
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try  i’s  returns he obtained using free information. If the investor chooses 
not to pay the information cost, the portfolio choice involves the world 
fund, with asset return moments p and a2,  and country i, with mean return 
r*, variance af, and correlation with the world fund q.  On the other hand, 
if he pays the information cost, the characteristics of asset returns in the 
J - 1 countries are unchanged, but the mean and variance of country i 
returns are updated. 
We  simplify significantly the model so as to characterize the nature of 
costly information in a manner that enables us to derive clear analytical 
results, leaving to section  1.3 the numerical analysis of the more general 
setting. In particular, costly information lets investors learn the “true” re- 
turn of country i with full certainty. Thus, investors who pay K learn a rate 
of  return  r1  with zero variance. Before paying  K, however, the potential 
update of the return is a random variable drawn from a known probability 
distribution function (pdf). Clearly, the investor will pay the information 
cost only if the expected utility obtained by  gathering information, EU‘, 
exceeds that of remaining uninformed, EU” (i.e., the gain from informa- 
tion searching S = EU’  -  EU” must be positive). 
Consider an initial equilibrium in which country i is identical to the rest 
(i.e., r* = p and a‘  = aJ  = a)  and asset returns are uncorrelated (q = 0). 
It is trivial to show that in this initial equilibrium the share of the portfolio 
invested in each country is 1/J  and the mean and variance of the portfolio 
return are p and a2/J,  respectively. We offer two motivations for investors 
to have incentives to acquire costly information. First, investors may be 
willing to pay for eliminating the uncertainty of investing in country  i. 
Second, investors may use information to assess the veracity of an exoge- 
nous and “reliable” rumor that country i’s mean return is r, r 5 p,  while 
the variance is still a2.4 
Let OU and 0’ be the portfolio shares chosen by the investor if he decides 
to be uninformed or informed respectively. Ignoring variable costs, Ou is 
set so as to maximize expected utility: 
The solution for the optimal portfolio is 
(3) 
4. Note that in the first case we must impose the consistency condition E(rflK) = r*, since 
r* is an expectation based on free information and the distribution of rf is also known at no 
cost, while in the second case this condition is not required because investors are trying to 
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Short positions are ruled out by  assumption. Thus, 8" = 1 for r 5 rml", 
where rml"  = p -  [ya2/(J  - l)], and Ou = 0 for r 2  rmax,  where rmax  = p + 
yu2.  Notice that as J goes to 00, the interval of returns that supports inter- 
nal solutions shrinks to rmdn  -  rmln  = yu2. 
For rumors within the interval rml"  < r < rmax  ,  expected utility valued 
at the maximum is 
Alternatively, if r 5 rmin,  EUu = p -  [yu2/2(J  -  l)], and if r 2  Pax,  EU" = 
r -  yu2/2. 
Next we  study the portfolio problem if the investor pays for country i 
information. An investor that paid  K  and learned  r'  will  maximize the 
following state-contingent utility function: 
The optimal, state-contingent portfolio is 
Short positions are again ruled out, so 0'(r')  = 0 if  rl 2 p,  and W(r~)  = 1 
if r'  2  rli, where rli, is 
(7)  Y  uL  rfnin =  p-  ~ 
J-  1' 
Note that rk,, rises with J, and converges to p as J grows without bound. 
Thus, the interval that allows the portfolio of an informed agent not to be 
specialized shrinks to almost zero as the market grows infinitely large. 
The solution in equation (6)  is only for the realization r'. Expected util- 
ity in the scenario in which the investor chooses to acquire information is 
determined by 
wherej(r')  is the pdf of  r', and the corresponding cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) is defined as F(r[). 
Obviously, the fixed cost can be set large enough so that S is negative, 
and hence agents would choose not to be informed. Less obvious is the 
fact that, under fairly general conditions, S is a decreasing function of J 
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PROPOSITION  1. For any ‘pessimistic”  rumor such that rmin  <  r <  rmdx  and 
r 5 p,  and assuming that both F  and f  are continuously diferentiable, 
the gain  of acquiring  country-specijic information  S  is a  decreasing 
junction of J (i.e., dS/dJ < 0) if the number of countries in the market 
is at least J < 1/[1 -  F(P)”~]. 
The proof of this proposition is provided in Calvo and Mendoza (2000a). 
Here we  simplify the exposition by adopting that result for dSldJ in the 
case in which short positions are ruled out: 
Setting r‘  = rL, in equation (9), we obtain 
Since rml”  < r 5 p,  it follows that J > 1/[1 -  F(p)”*] is sufficient for dSldJ 
< 0. 
A simple interpretation of this result is the following. Consider a case 
in which there is no rumor (i.e., r = p),  so that costly information elimi- 
nates the variance of country i returns (i.e., the last terms in equations [9] 
and [lo]  vanish). It follows from equation (10) that as J increases, both the 
expected utility ‘of being informed  and of being uninformed  increase to 
the extent that a higher J makes the world fund a less risky asset. Proposi- 
tion 1 establishes a sufficiency condition for the utility gain of being unin- 
formed to be larger than that for being informed, so S falls as J rises. What 
lies behind this condition is the fact that in those “bad” states of nature 
in which costly information reveals that agents should short country i, the 
“second best” choice if these positions are ruled out is to allocate the entire 
portfolio  to the world  fund. State-contingent  utility  for those  states of 
nature increases as J rises but at a rate that (1) declines as J rises and (2) 
declines faster than the rate at which the utility gain of being uninformed 
falls as J rises. As a result, eventually the utility of being uninformed in- 
creases by more than that of being informed as J rises, and S falls. 
The above scenario (in which there is no rumor and costly information 
eliminates the variance of one asset in the investor’s portfolio) is compa- 
rable to the standard analysis of the value of information to individual 
investors in the finance literature (see Pritsker  1994). However, our find- 
ings are strikingly  different  because of the assumption ruling out short 
positions. If  there were no restrictions on short positions, as in the stan- 22  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
dard case in the value-of-information literature, dSldJ eventually becomes 
increasing in J as J rises, instead of decreasing. This is because with unlim- 
ited short positions the utility of being informed rises as J rises at a rate 
that does not depend on J, while that of being uninformed still increases 
at a rate that is declining in J. 
While absolutely ruling out short positions seems unrealistic, some form 
of short-selling constraints can be easily justified in the conventional way, 
by  arguing that they will emerge naturally because of the risk of bank- 
ruptcy. Consider a case in  which J  has grown so large as to make the 
world fund virtually risk free. There could be states of nature in which the 
earnings of the riskless asset are not sufficient to cover the losses of the 
risky asset. In our framework with information frictions, one can argue in 
addition that short-selling constraints make sense because otherwise as J 
rises informed  agents would take infinitely large positions in the world 
fund-as  predicted by equation (6). It is difficult to argue that information 
would remain costly to gather in an environment like this. Moreover, in 
exploring the implications of allowing limited short selling in the model 
presented above, we found that the key results described here are robust 
to this modification (Calvo and Mendoza 2000a). 
Equations (9) and (10) show that there are two key determinants of the 
critical market size after which S becomes a negative function of J:  The 
first is the position of the mean return of the world portfolio (i.e., p) in the 
distribution of country i returns that agents learn if they pay the fixed cost. 
For example, iff  is symmetric and E(r’) = p,  F(p) = 0.5 and dS1dJ is 
negative with as few as four countries. If F(p) is smaller (larger) than one- 
half, which implies that E(r’) is larger (smaller) than p,  the critical value 
of J falls (iises). The intuition is that, if investors are “bullish” on country 
i in the sense that E(r’) > p,  the incentives to gather information begin to 
decrease with J for a smaller market than when investors are “bearish” on 
country  i.  When costly information is expected to produce good news, 
incentives for acquiring it are weak. The second determinant is the size of 
the rumor. If the rumor is very optimistic, in the sense that r 2 rmax,  one 
can show that dSldJ is always positive. At the other extreme, for very 
pessimistic rumors r 5 rmln,  one can show that dSldJis always nonpositive. 
Pessimistic rumors inside the interval relevant for proposition  1 play a 
similar role. Consider again the case in which  f is symmetric. A pessimistic 
rumor such that rmrn  < r < p implies that dSIdJ may be negative even if 
F(p) is somewhat larger than one-half (i.e., with r < p,  the critical value of 
J falls for any given F(p)).  Thus, a bad rumor reduces the benefits of gath- 
ering information on country i as the market expands even if investors are 
bearish about country i (i.e., E(r‘) < p). 
Two final remarks. First, as the market grows infinitely large the gain of 
gathering country-specific information becomes independent of the size 
of the global market. This is because in the limit, as J +  00, both rmln  and Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows  23 
r,&,, converge to p,  as a very large global market offers a risk-free asset at 
the rate of  return  P.~  Second, as J  rises, not  only are the incentives to 
gather information diminishing as J  goes to infinity, but the impact of 
rumors on the allocation of investment funds to a single country by unin- 
formed  investors, relative to the  initial allocations  1/J,  grows without 
bound. This is because -de”/dr converges to l/ya2  in the limit as J +  OQ. 
1.2.2  Variable Performance Costs 
Consider now the effects of variable costs linked to the performance of 
portfolio managers, and set K = 0. Variable costs allow the model to pro- 
duce contagion  as  a result  of  multiple equilibria in  optimal  portfolio 
shares, and this has the advantage of making the response to rumors iden- 
tified above more persistent. This is useful because otherwise contagion 
could be  ruled out by  arguing that whenever investors react to a rumor 
there is a sell-off in the affected country’s stock market, and the ensuing 
“price correction” drives expected returns high enough to undo the effect 
of the rumor. The persistence of contagion could also be justified by self- 
fulfilling crises related to policy imbalances (as in Calvo 1998). 
We  consider identical mutual fund managers that pay a variable cost, 
or collect a benefit, when the mean return of the portfolio they manage 
deviates from the mean  return of an arbitrary market portfolio. These 
costs and gains are given by the function X(p(0) -  p(O)), which satisfies 
the following propertied 
(11)  X > 0 if  p(8) < p(O),  X 5  0 if p(8) > p(O),  X(0)  = 0, 
A’  2 0 with X’(x)  > A’(-x) for all x  = p(0)  -  p(8) > 0, 
A”  5 0. 
Hence, there is  a cost (benefit) when the mean return  of  the investor’s 
portfolio is smaller (larger) than that of the market portfolio and the mar- 
ginal cost exceeds the marginal gain. 
Fund managers choose 8, given some 0,  so as to maximize 
(12)  EU(8) =  8p + (1 - 8)r - X(p(0)  - p(8)) 
The variances of investing in country i (af)  and in all J countries except i 
(a:)  differ, and asset returns are correlated according to the correlation 
5. Note that this also implies that the result that S declines as J rises cannot be obtained 
if the portfolio included a riskless asset even for small .I  However, the focus of our study is 
on the composition of portfolios of country-specific risky assets, not on the choice between 
risky and riskless assets. 
6.  It is also assumed that X’(0)  does not exist to capture the notion of fixed costs. 24  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
coefficient q.  This portfolio optimization problem displays contagion in 
the sense that, for rumors within a certain contagion range of values of 0, 
choosing 0 = 0 is optimal for all investors in the global market. Within 
this range, a rumor calling for a different 0 results in a panic that induces 
all investors to reoptimize their portfolios and choose that new 0. 
The above result is  not all that  surprising since the assumption that 
poor performance is punished relatively more than good performance is 
rewarded provides an incentive to mimic market portfolios. We are more 
interested in a second result showing that in the presence of performance- 
related costs or benefits it is again the case that globalization strengthens 
incentives for contagion (i.e., the contagion range widens as the global 
market grows for a given cost function). These results are established in 
propositions 2 and 3. 
PROPOSITION  2. If in the neighborhood of the optimal portfolio 8* corre- 
sponding to an investor free of information frictions, the marginal per- 
formance cost  (gain) of  deviating from the mean return of  the market 
portfolio  ~(0)  is suficiently large  (small), there exists a  contagion 
range of  individual portfolio allocations 0, such that investors optimally 
choose 0 = 0. 
The proof is provided in Calvo and Mendoza (2000a). Here we provide a 
graphical example showing that, as long as near 8* the marginal perfor- 
mance cost exceeds the marginal gain, there is a range of values of 0 for 
which setting 0 = 0 is optimal. 
Consider the first-order condition for maximization  of equation  (1  2) 
with respe,ct to 8: 
(13)  Eriy0) - X’(.)(r - p)  =  0, 
ELj’(0) = p -  r -  y{  0a;/(J -  1) -  (1 - 8)u; + qu,  q[(l -  0) - 81) 
where 
is the marginal utility of 8 for an investor that does not face information 
frictions, so E0(0*)  = 0 at the optimum O*.  Note that the second-order 
condition El?(8)  < 0 requires u:/(J -  1) + a:  >  2-quJal.  Clearly, it follows 
from equation (13) that if r = p the solution 0* is the unique solution of 
the model, and there is no contagion. Thus, contagion in this model re- 
quires that r and p differ. 
A particular case of equation (13) is illustrated in figure 1.1, which as- 
sumes that r > p,  that the marginal gain for beating the market is zero, 
and that  there  is a  constant marginal  cost  paid  for producing  below- 
market returns (i.e., a linear function for the performance incentives). Any 
value of 0 within the indicated contagion range implies that it is optimal 
to set 0 = 0.  To  see why, first consider what would happen if the investor Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows  25 
marginal utility, marginal cost 
I  marginal utility without performance costs 
contagion range 
Fig.  1.1  Multiple optimal portfolios in the presence of performance costs 
tried  8 < 0.  He would be beating the market-this  can be easily con- 
firmed because the difference between individual and market returns can 
be expressed as (0 -  8)(p -  r).  Given a zero marginal gain for beating the 
market and the fact that Eo(8)  is positive for 8 < 0 9 8*, the marginal 
utility of portfolio reoptimization  is positive. If, on the other hand, the 
investor tried 8 > 0,  he would now produce a mean return lower than the 
market and pay the constant marginal cost. Within the contagion range 
this marginal cost exceeds the marginal utility of an investor not subject 
to information frictions, as shown in figure 1.1, and hence the net marginal 
utility of setting'a portfolio 8 > 0 is negative. Thus, 8 = 0 is the optimal 
choice. Moreover, it is easy to see that contagion equilibria cannot exist 
in figure 1.1 for any 0 2 8*. A similar argument can be constructed to 
show that, for r < p,  there is a contagion range for some values of 0 in 
the region 0 2  8*, and that in this case there are no contagion equilibria 
for 0 5  8*. 
PROPOSITION  3. The contagion range, defined by the values of 0 in the 
interval  81°w < 0 < 8"p for which proposition 2 holds, widens as the 
global market grows (i.e., 8"p -  8loW  is increasing in J). 
The proof is again in Calvo and Mendoza (2000a), where we  show that, 
for a linear marginal cost function as the one in figure 1.1, the total differ- 
ential of equation (1  3) and the second-order condition stated earlier imply 
that d8IdJ is positive and increasing in 8. Thus, as J rises both 8"p and 8loW 
rise, but, since OUP >  elow,  8"p rises more than elow  and hence the contagion 
range widens. In graphical terms, the downward sloping line that repre- 
sents Eo(8)  in figure 1.1 shifts counterclockwise around its vertical inter- 
cept as J  rises. 26  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
The intuition  for this result is  simple. Given a marginal reputational 
cost invariant to J or 8, the growth of the global market can only affect 
the expected marginal utility of optimal portfolios in two ways. First, as J 
rises, the effective variance of the world fund (cr:l(J - 1)')  falls, and thus 
the marginal utility of 8 rises. This effect is proportional to the portfolio 
share invested in the world fund. Second, the reduced variance of the 
world fund makes this asset more attractive relative to country i, providing 
an incentive to increase 8, which in turn reduces marginal utility. The mag- 
nitude of this second effect is independent of 8 because the rate at which 
marginal utility falls as 8 rises is invariant to portfolio shares with a linear 
marginal utility (as in fig. 1.1). Hence, the portfolio shift induced by mar- 
ket growth is larger the larger the initial 8. We also prove (Calvo and Men- 
doza 2000a), however, that d0ldJ is decreasing in J and converges to 0 as J 
goes to infinity because in a large market the world fund becomes riskless. 
Since the portfolio 8* of  the investor free of  information frictions is 
Pareto-efficient, all portfolios within the contagion range are suboptimal. 
This is because 8" maximizes EU(8), and EU(8) = EU(8)  whenever 8 = 
0  since X(0)  = 0. Moreover, the existence of multiple optimal portfolios 
for a given pair of mean returns rand p implies that there can be capital out- 
flows from country i even in the absence of rumors about country asset re- 
turns. This also implies that a price correction following a rumor about r 
may not prevent persistent contagion. 
1.2.3  A Comparison with Models of Costly Information, 
Contagion, and Herd Behavior 
The fixed cost of acquiring information featured in our model is remi- 
niscent of the information costs driving the models of informational effi- 
ciency in the tradition of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980). Our focus, 
however, is on the implications of market size for the profitability of gath- 
ering costly information in a partial equilibrium setting where asset prices 
are exogenous. In contrast, the classic finding of  Grossman and Stiglitz 
that incentives to gather costly information are reduced by  the fact that 
prices can partially or totally reveal that information emphasizes the gen- 
eral equilibrium determination of prices. The Grossman-Stiglitz argument 
suggests that if our model is examined in general equilibrium it may yield 
even  smaller expected utility gains of  gathering costly country-specific 
information,  for  any given  J, because endogenous changes in  asset re- 
turns would reveal some or all of  the information at no cost. Through 
this channel, therefore, we would expect a general equilibrium analysis to 
strengthen our results rather than weaken them. 
Our framework also considers a global market consisting of  a large 
number of  identical investors formulating simultaneous decisions. This 
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models of herd beha~ior.~  These models show that when information is 
incomplete and the signals that transmit it are noisy, agents waiting in line 
to make a decision may imitate agents ahead of them rather than use their 
own information (a situation referred to as an “informational cascade”). 
Our framework can easily be incorporated into a sequential decision- 
making setting. Consider the case with variable performance incentives, 
viewed as the “sharing-the-blame’’ reputational effects that induce herd- 
ing externalities in Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Assume N investors wait- 
ing in  line to choose their portfolios observe the portfolios chosen  by 
investors ahead of them, with the first one facing an arbitrary 0. Each 
investor draws a piece of news at random that acts as a shift parameter in 
A’,  so marginal costs are indexed by h for h = 1, . . . ,  N. The A$  are like 
the signals introduced in Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, 
and Welch (1992), with the distribution of A‘ defined to have positive (neg- 
ative) support for 8 > 0  (0 < 0).  Under these conditions, there can be 
informational cascades in which the agents first in line may draw ALs  such 
that they choose 0,  thereby increasing the incentives for followers to also 
choose 0.  In some of these cascades everybody chooses 0,  and herd behav- 
ior dominates. Since for any A,  the contagion range widens as J rises, a set 
of signals that supported an equilibrium without herding in a small market 
can produce an informational cascade with herding in a large market. 
The contagion models examined by Shiller (1995) also have an interest- 
ing connection with our model. Contagion by  word of mouth provides 
microfoundations for the determination  of 0  or r,  and for the process 
leading from one value of 0  to another within the range of herding equi- 
libria. Survey data collected by  Shiller and Pound (1986, 1987) provide 
further evidence of word-of-mouth contagion among institutional inves- 
tors in the United States. 
1.3  Quantitative Implications of the Model 
We  proceed next to explore the model’s quantitative implications. In 
order to conduct numerical simulations, we calibrate a benchmark version 
of the model to reflect basic statistical properties of international asset 
returns and portfolio holdings. We do not test the model’s ability to explain 
actual investment behavior, since it is well known that the mean-variance 
7. Our analysis adopts some assumptions similar to those used in game-theoretic  models. 
In Banerjee (1992) payoffs are discontinuous at the “true value” of asset returns, resembling 
the discontinuity of A’  at 8 = 0.  Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 
(1992) require two sources of uncertainty (about outcomes and about signals), while in our 
model investors considering whether to pay the fixed information cost face uncertainty about 
asset return “fundamentals” and about potential updates of mean and variances of assets re- 
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model cannot explain actual portfolio allocations, particularly the “home” 
bias of international portfolios (see Tesar and Werner 1995a). Our intent 
is simply to quantify how large contagion effects can be because of the 
information frictions we proposed. 
1.3.1  Calibration 
The benchmark calibration requires a value for the preference parame- 
ter y, estimates of the mean and variance of country asset returns, and a 
framework for characterizing the nature of costly information and for how 
this information maps into updates of the mean and variance of country 
asset returns. The value of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, y, is 
set to make the model consistent with existing estimates of the mean and 
variance-covariance structure of asset returns, and data on net holdings of 
foreign equity by global investors, assuming a conventional mean-variance 
setup without information or reputational costs. The equation that relates 
y to 0 and the statistical moments of asset returns is derived by solving 
equation (13) for y setting A‘(  - ) = 0. Using various data sets that exist in 
the home bias literature (see, e.g., Bohn and Tesar 1994; Lewis 1995; and 
Tesar and Werner 1995b), we found that plausible values of y range be- 
tween near 0 and l/2.  We chose the middle point l/4  for the benchmark cal- 
ibration. Note, however, that there are also several data combinations that 
produce negative values of y, highlighting the weaknesses of the mean- 
variance model. 
The best available measure of costly country-specific information is em- 
bodied in the CCRs constructed by investment banks, and compiled and 
published every six months, in March and September, by Institutional In- 
vestor.  Figure  1.2 plots the time-series average of each country’s CCR 
against  the corresponding  standard deviation,  using  all available data, 
which in most cases covers the period September 1979-March  1996. Fig- 
ure 1.3 is a similar plot that includes only member countries of the Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Latin 
American countries. 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show that credit ratings are significantly more vari- 
able in emerging markets than they are in either industrialized or least- 
developed economies. Emerging markets are defined here as those with 
credit ratings between 20 and 80-high-risk  countries have ratings lower 
than 20 and industrialized countries have ratings higher than 80. This evi- 
dence suggests that when asset trading restrictions among industrial coun- 
tries were lifted in the 1980s, the newly created global market consisted of 
countries of roughly similar risk quality. The globalization of the 1990s 
expanded to emerging markets where asset returns are intrinsically more 
risky, and where information gathered on economic, social, and political 
issues results in much larger innovations to credit ratings than in OECD 
countries. Under these conditions, it may in principle be valuable to ac- Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows  29 
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Fig. 1.3  Variability of country credit ratings in Latin America and the OECD 
quire costly country-specific information. We must still determine, how- 
ever, whether a globalized market provides enough incentives for investors 
to pay for this information. 
The calibration is completed by  specifying a framework for mapping 
the costly information of the CCRs into probability  distributions from 30  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
which updates of  means and variances of  asset returns are drawn.8 We 
adopt a framework created by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) to fore- 
cast the mean and variance of asset returns in eighty countries for which 
CCRs exist but equity markets do not. These authors estimated log-linear 
panel regressions of the mean and variance of returns on the information 
innovations measured by  CCRs for countries with equity markets, and 
used them to forecast means and variances of returns in countries without 
equity markets. In particular, they estimated panel regressions of the form 
xhl+,  = ax  + P”ln(CCR,,) + u;/+l,  where x  = the mean (p,)  or standard 
deviation (sd) of asset returns in country h. This exercise assumes normal 
distributions for the one-step-ahead mean and variance of returns, which 
are defined by 
E[r‘]  =  a’  +  PpE[ln(CCR,)], 
E[ui]  =  aSd  +  P”dE[ln(CCR,,)], 
crf  = (p’)’VAR[ln(CCR,)]  + (IJ~)~, 
and 
u:  = (psd)ZVAR[ln(CCR,)]  + 
Assuming that the regressions are homogenous across countries, the re- 
gression coefficients and the data on CCRs can be combined to compute 
these four moments for the 144 countries with credit ratings data. A table 
listing these moments for each country is available from the authors on re- 
quest. 
For countries with equity markets, the predicted moments based on the 
regressions created by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta can be compared to the 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of returns produced using 
historical equity-market data, as shown in figure 1.4. This chart plots up- 
dates of the mean and standard deviations of returns based on the Septem- 
ber 1996 CCRs against each country’s CCR. Updates are measured as a 
difference relative to the corresponding statistical moment based on his- 
torical equity-market data. Figure 1.4 shows that costly information gen- 
erally results in positive updates of mean returns and reduced estimates of 
the variability of asset returns. Moreover, emerging markets yield relatively 
large upward adjustments in expected returns and large downward revi- 
sions in  standard deviations of returns, while updates of  the mean and 
variance of returns for OECD countries are generally small. 
8. Note that although Institutional Investor provides CCRs at a trivial cost, the published 
ratings are not free information at the relevant moment in which investment banks design 
portfolios. Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows  31 
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1.3.2  Contagion Due to Fixed Information Costs 
formed agents: 
The  simulations use  the  following expected  utility  function  for  in- 
mm 
(14)  EU'-  K = j'Jj-eyr~,~;)p  + (1 - eyr+;)y 
where f  and g are normal, independent probability distribution functions 
and e'(rI,ai)  is the optimal portfolio of an informed investor contingent 
on updates (r'pf).  The simulations consider an evenly spaced grid of ru- 
mors about the country i return, with 120 elements spanning the interval 
[rmin,rmax],  and allow J to vary from two to forty-two countries. The double 
integral in equation (14) is computed by Gauss-Legendre quadrature, set- 
ting integration limits so that the integral captures 98 percent of the joint 
cumulative distribution function of  rl and a!. 
Consider first a case simplified to illustrate the theoretical results of 32  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
section  1.2 within the context of the relatively stable equity markets of 
OECD countries. This requires the restrictive assumptions that (1) asset 
returns are uncorrelated  (q = 0), (2) ex  ante the mean and variance of 
asset returns are the same in all countries (v*  = p and at = aJ),  (3) the 
information acquired at a fixed cost reveals the true country i asset return 
(i.e., E[a:]  = ui = 0), and (4) the expected update of country i’s  return 
equals the world return, E(rr)  = p. The values of p,  uJ,  and a:  are set to 
p = 15.31 percent, a,  = 22.44 percent, and a:  = 6.46 percent. The first 
two moments are arithmetic averages of the annualized mean and stan- 
dard deviation of monthly stock returns in U.S. dollars over the period 
1979-95  for OECD countries with “stable markets,” and the third moment 
is an average of the estimates of af  computed using the forecasting frame- 
work  of  Erb,  Harvey, and Viskanta  (1996). The OECD countries with 
“stable markets” include OECD members during the entire 1979-95  pe- 
riod for which the standard deviation of returns did not exceed 30 percent. 
This excludes Greece, New Zealand, Portugal, and Turkey. 
Figure 1.5 plots S, ignoring K, as a function of J for values of the rumor 
equal to rml”,  rmax,  and the neutral rumor r = r*  = p. The chart confirms 
proposition 1 and its implications for very pessimistic and very optimistic 
rumors. S is generally decreasing in J for all moderate-to-pessimistic ru- 
mors and increasing in J for a very optimistic rumor. S is decreasing in J 
even for J <  4 in the neutral-rumor case because proposition 1 establishes 
only a sufficiency condition. In this example, however, investors facing 
pessimistic rumors (r 5 p) are willing to pay hefty fixed information costs 
exceeding 30 percent (in terms of mean portfolio return) if J  = 2. As J 
grows to include about a dozen countries, S falls sharply but still converges 
to a relatiGely large amount of nearly 4 percent. At 4 percent, the fixed 
cost would have to be about one-third of the expected portfolio return 
before the rumor emerged (15.3 percent) in order to induce contagion. 
Still, this experiment shows that only twelve countries are required for the 
adverse effect of globalization on information gains to be in full force, and 
that this effect cuts information gains sharply. 
Next we strengthen the effects of the informational frictions by consid- 
ering the more realistic case in which information cannot reveal true asset 
returns. Hence, agents only learn updates of the mean and variance of 
returns drawn from known probability distributions. The moments that 
fully describe these normal, independent  distributions are again deter- 
mined using the forecasting model of Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) 
applied to “stable” OECD markets. This implies setting E(r’)  = 15.18, 
E[af = 21.8  1, af = 6.46, and u:  = 1.84.  We maintain for now the assump- 
tions that ex ante all countries are perceived to be identical (r* = p and 
ut = uJ)  and that asset returns are uncorrelated. The resulting S function 
is plotted in figure 1.6. 
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cannot reveal true asset returns, the gains of information gathering can 
fall very sharply. In the case of the neutral rumor r = r* (the middle panels 
of figs. 1.5 and 1.6), the gains of acquiring information decline from 3  1 to 
1 percent for a market with two countries, and from about 4.0 to 0.1 per- 
cent in markets with more than twelve countries. A cost of 0.1 percent is 
only 0.6 percent of the ex ante mean return of the total portfolio (r*  = 
p = 15.3  l), so in this circumstances investors are very reluctant to pay infor- 
mation costs. S is small even for mildly pessimistic rumors (a rumor that 
country i's  return is 11 percent yields S = 3.1 percent for J = 2 and S = 0.4 
percent for J = 12). Moreover, in a large market with at least twelve coun- 
tries, S converges to less than 0.45 percent for any rumor rmln  f  r 5 r*. 
The above exercise can be easily modified to consider the fact that the 
correlation of asset returns in the OECD ranges from 0.3 to 0.6 (see Bohn 
and Tesar 1994; Lewis 1995; and Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta 1996). This is 
done by setting -q  = 0.35.9  This positive correlation of returns yields even 
smaller gains of information gathering, with the value of S for rm'"  and J = 
2 falling from 32 to 22 percent. Note, however, that positive correlation 
between country i and the world fund can bias the results against gather- 
ing information on country i because of the implicit assumption that the 
asset returns of the J - 1 countries in the world fund are uncorrelated 
and hence provide better diversification opportunities. Still, modifying the 
experiment to introduce correlation of asset returns across countries in 
the world fund at 0.35 does not alter the results significantly. 
We  are also interested in exploring how the model behaves when we 
consider that the global capital market includes a larger number of emerg- 
ing markets than stable OECD markets. In fact, the growing set of emerg- 
ing markets is often viewed as a group segmented from OECD markets. 
Thus, the relevant question might not be whether it is worthwhile to gather 
information about a single emerging economy in a market with J - 1 
OECD countries, but whether it is rational to acquire information in a 
market where most of the J - 1 countries are also volatile emerging mar- 
kets. To simulate this scenario, consider a case in which all countries are 
identical emerging markets ex  ante, with probabilistic parameters set to 
the averages for the Latin American countries that result from applying 
the model of Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) as in the previous cases. 
The resulting parameterization is as follows: E(r') = 33.12, E[uf = 34.57, 
uf = 49.31, ui  = 14.04, r*  = p = 31.21, and u,  = uJ  = 50.03. In this case 
rumors will prevail in a market with at least ten countries if information 
costs exceed 5 percent, or one-sixth of the ex ante expected portfolio re- 
turn (which is now 31.2 percent). Information gains still fall very sharply 
9. Given the means and variances of asset returns, and the value of y, higher correlation 
coefficients would violate the second-order conditions of the optimization problems of in- 
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as the market grows, and the full effect of market growth on S is transmit- 
ted with as few as ten countries. 
This last case assumed that information gathering yields average up- 
dates of the mean and standard deviations of returns equivalent to 1.06 
and 0.69 of the corresponding moments computed with historical equity 
market data. However, figure 1.4 showed that the moments that describe 
the distributions of updates can vary widely across countries. For instance, 
in the cases of Argentina, Colombia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South 
Africa, information yields sharply lower expected returns than historical 
equity market statistics, while updates of the standard deviation vary from 
sharp reductions to moderate increases. In Colombia’s case, for example, 
the average update of the mean return is 0.77 of the equity market forecast, 
while the standard deviation of returns is virtually the same with or with- 
out gathering information. In this case the information gain for a neutral 
rumor r = r* is 7 percent if J = 2. As J grows to include twenty countries, 
information gains fall to about 0.5 percent for any rumor rmln  5 r 5 Y*. 
With the ex ante expected portfolio return at 31.2 percent, this implies 
that investors in a large global market will not pay information costs ex- 
ceeding  1.6 percent  of the ex  ante portfolio return. Indonesia’s case is 
quite different, at least over the sample period under study. Information 
gathered on Indonesia results in sharp upward updates of the mean return, 
while revisions to the standard deviation remain negligible as in Colom- 
bia’s case. Since information yields much higher returns than the history 
of Indonesia’s stock market, with about the same standard deviation, S 
reaches about 18 percent for any rumor rmln 5 r 9 r* with J 2  20. Thus, 
investors are willing to pay up more than one-half of the ex ante portfolio 
return to leirn about rumors affecting Indonesia. 
It is also important to quantify the international capital flows that may 
take place in situations in which there is contagion among global investors. 
To gain an insight on this issue, we simulated the model setting parameters 
so that the J - 1 countries represent stable OECD markets and country i 
is calibrated to Mexican data using the framework of Erb, Harvey, and 
Viskanta  (1996). The probabilistic  parameters  are now  set  as  follows: 
E(r‘) = 33.12, E[uf]  = 34.57, af = 49.31, u;  = 14.04, r*  = 22.4, p = 15.31, 
u, = 50.03, and uJ  = 22.44. In this scenario, the simulations show that if 
the fixed information cost exceeds 6.5 percent (or about two-fifths of the 
ex ante mean portfolio return of 15.4 percent), pessimistic rumors about 
Mexico would prevail. A rumor that reduces the expected return on Mexi- 
can equity from the equity market forecast of 22.4 percent to the level of 
the OECD mean return of 15.3 percent leads to a reduction in the share of 
the world portfolio invested in Mexico from 1.7 percent to 0.7 percent-a 
reduction of 40 percent. According to the Bolsa de Valores de Mexico (the 
Mexican stock exchange), direct foreign holdings of Mexican equity ex- 
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to $20 billion,1° which is a very large amount for a country where foreign 
reserves rarely exceed that same figure. For rumors that set r below  10 
percent, the short-sale restrictions become binding and Mexican equity is 
eliminated from the portfolio,  with  a  resulting  outflow of  the full $50 
billion. 
1.3.3 
The simulation  exercises conclude with an analysis of the contagion 
region created by performance-related variable costs. We maintain the set- 
tings of the last example involving Mexico and the OECD. The variable 
cost function takes the following form: h = cp(p(0) -  p(8)) with cp  = 15 
for all p(0) > p(8) and cp  = 0 otherwise."  The contagion range shows 
that, when J  = 2, the share of portfolio invested in Mexico can fluctuate 
between 20.2 and 22.5 percent, or about 2.3 percentage points, on account 
of contagion. With ten OECD countries the range widens by about one- 
half of a percentage point, with the portfolio share invested in Mexico 
varying between 3.8 and 6.6 percent. 
The total reputational costs avoided by displaying herding behavior or 
contagion are small. When J  = 20, and assuming 0  = 8*, the maximum 
reputational  cost paid  for choosing  the largest 8 within  the contagion 
range is one-tenth of the mean portfolio return. Thus, contagion can po- 
tentially induce large capital flows into and out of emerging markets even 
in the presence of small total performance-linked costs. The marginal cost, 
however, is large in  the sense that it represents a punishment  for poor 
performance fifteen times the difference between the mean return paid by 
the market and that paid  by  the investor's portfolio. Note also that, as 
shown in section 1.2, the contagion range is increasing in J but does not 
grow without bound as J rises. The size of the range converges to about 
2.8 percentage points as J approaches -. 
Next we measure the capital flows triggered by reputational effects. As- 
sume that the investors' total wealth corresponds to the holdings of for- 
eign equity by U.S. investors. The latest Benchmark Survey of  US.  Hold- 
ings of Foreign Securities conducted by  the treasury department reports 
that by end-March 1994 the holdings of foreign equity by US. investors 
amounted to $566 billion. The model predicts that with J = 20 the fraction 
of US. foreign equity invested in Mexico fluctuates between 2.53 and 5.31 
percent.  Thus,  herding  panics  triggered  by  reputational  effects  can 
Variable Costs and the Contagion Region 
10.  The figure on the value of foreign holdings  in  Mexico's market was quoted in the 
Mexican newspaper Reforma, 15 January 1998, p. 1  A, citing as source the Mexican stock ex- 
change. 
11. Calvo and Mendoza (2000a) examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the 
value of  cp  and in the other exogenous parameters of the model (q,y,ur,  and u,). The results 
show that our findings are generally robust to parameter variations. 
12. Interestingly, the treasury's  Survey estimates the U.S. holdings of Mexican equity at 
6.2 percent of the total holdings of foreign equity by  U.S. investors. 38  Guillermo A. Calvo and Enrique G. Mendoza 
account for sudden capital flows into and out of Mexico as large as $15.7 
billion. If we  add foreign investment in bonds, the total foreign security 
holdings of US. investors reach about $870 billion, and thus herding could 
account for Mexican capital flows of up to $24.2 billion. As noted earlier, 
in a country where foreign reserves normally amount to less than $20 bil- 
lion, of which $10 billion are widely regarded as the desirable minimum 
(see Calvo and Mendoza 1996), these flows can be an important determi- 
nant of vulnerability to balance-of-payments crises. 
Despite the large capital flows that contagion can produce, it does not 
appear to embody significant welfare costs. We computed the percentage 
change in consumption needed for a portfolio within the contagion range 
to yield the same utility of a portfolio chosen in the conventional mean- 
variance model without information frictions (i.e., O*). These calculations 
make use of the model's direct utility function: E -  exp(-yC).  The wel- 
fare costs never exceed 2.5 percent, and for portfolio share variations of 
100 basis points  around  the  first-best optimum  the  costs are actually 
smaller than one-fourth of a percentage point. Moreover, since EO(O) and 
O*  are invariant to X,  it follows that variations in the marginal reputational 
cost do not alter this result-although  of course lowering the marginal 
cost narrows the contagion range. 
1.4  Concluding Remarks 
We  used a basic model  of  international  portfolio diversification with 
incomplete information to show that the globalization of securities mar- 
kets can reduce incentives for information gathering, and hence produce 
high volatil'ity  in capital flows as a result of contagion. In our model this 
occurs because globalization generally reduces the gains derived from pay- 
ing fixed costs for country-specific information or because, in the presence 
of variable performance-linked or reputational costs, globalization widens 
the contagion range of portfolios within which investors find it optimal to 
mimic arbitrary market portfolios. 
The notion that a fixed information cost may be of practical relevance, 
given the large amount of investment resources in the hands of securities 
firms, seems controversial. While it is quite reasonable to argue that fixed 
costs are less relevant for these firms, it is important to note two related 
issues that are particularly complex in an international context. First, the 
cost of  learning about the macroeconomic features of  a country is not 
very different regardless of the size of the country and the amount of the 
investment involved. Hence, information gathering in an international set- 
ting is relatively costly. Second, the possibility that fixed costs can be easily 
overcome by clusters of investors setting up securities firms in which other 
investors could invest can be a source for further complications, rather 
than a solution. For instance, as Calvo and Mendoza (2000b) show, mar- Contagion, Globalization, and the Volatility of Capital Flows  39 
ket volatility can be exacerbated by the interaction of a cluster of “sophis- 
ticated” (i.e., informed) traders with a group of uninformed investors in 
the face of systemic shocks forcing sophisticated traders to sell their assets, 
assuming that traders face binding borrowing constraints. 
Contagion resulting from variable performance costs, or reputational 
considerations,  can be challenged  on the premise that  securities firms 
would not be maximizing the payoff to their investors if they implemented 
incentive  schemes  like  the  one  we  studied,  which  yield  inefficient, 
contagion-driven outcomes. While we  lack specific evidence on incentive 
structures to determine if they resemble the one we  assumed, the survey 
evidence documented by Shiller and Pound (1986, 1987) indicates that rep- 
utational concerns, the “fear of being different,” and contagion by word 
of mouth seem to play an important role. Moreover, in some instances the 
perverse incentive structure may be the result of government regulation. 
In Chile, for example, individual private pension funds are required  by 
government regulation to produce returns within a certain range of the 
average return for all pension funds. Thus, the regulation sets a cost for 
producing below-market returns and no gain for producing above-market 
returns, which is  the main feature of  the incentive structure leading to 
contagion in the model we studied. 
In light of our findings, it is natural to raise the question of whether 
globalization is necessarily welfare improving, and to suggest that the pros 
and cons of abolishing capital controls may deserve further consideration. 
Our results do not challenge classic notions related to the efficiency gains 
derived from global market integration in a frictionless environment, al- 
though evidence indicates that these gains, at least from the perspective 
of risk sharing and consumption smoothing, could be small (see Mendoza 
1991 and Tesar 1995). However, this paper does suggest that in the pres- 
ence of severe information frictions, capital flows can be extremely volatile 
and optimal portfolios are generally Pareto-inefficient. 
The inefficiencies seemed small when we  computed the corresponding 
welfare costs in a basic model in which all agents are global investors; but 
it is easy to imagine situations in which these costs can be substantial, as 
the recent  experiences of  Mexico, Argentina, Russia,  and several East 
Asian countries indicate. One example is the case of a typical developing 
country that depends on capital inflows to finance imports of consumer 
and capital goods, and uses the latter as inputs to produce tradable and 
nontradable goods. There could be two types of agents in this economy: 
“workers,” who derive income only from labor services and cannot access 
global capital markets to insure themselves against income fluctuations 
induced by  capital flows; and “global investors,” with their wealth and 
income globally diversified. Contagion in this environment could be dev- 
astating for “workers,” particularly those that produce nontraded goods, 
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welfare could also suffer. Heterogeneity in this setting would play a key 
role, since it is well known that welfare costs of country-specific risk im- 
plied by limited world asset trading in pure consumption-smoothing mod- 
els are trivial (see Mendoza 1991), unless there is a channel linking volatil- 
ity and growth (as in Obstfeld 1994 and Mendoza 1997). 
Increased global market volatility can also induce large social costs if it 
serves as a vehicle that enhances distortions leading to self-fulfilling crises. 
For example, if, as in Calvo (1998), there are situations in which the ability 
of  a government to roll over its debt is compromised by  a sudden run 
on its securities in global markets, agents may expect that current fiscal 
adjustment may need to be  so large in  order to pay for maturing debt 
that it will  cripple the economy and affect adversely future government 
revenues. The latter could justify the expectation that the government will 
default, making the beliefs about default self-fulfilling. 
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Comment  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Calvo and Mendoza’s paper is an enviable piece of research in being both 
topical and thoroughly elegant. The theory is state of the art, the execu- 
tion is flawless. Here is a theory of speculative attacks caused by masses 
of investors who find it far more profitable to run away than to ascertain 
whether the rumors are true: “Don’t ask questions,  run” is the bottom 
line and this follows rigorously from the model. It is an uncomfortable 
conclusion but not altogether an implausible one, since the world  does 
appear to warmly welcome emerging market assets one day and then, on 
sheer rumor, desert those assets at the drop of a hat. 
Fortunately  for world  capital markets,  Calvo and Mendoza’s conclu- 
sions are far less threatening than they might appear at first sight. While 
the conclusions do follow rigorously from their assumptions, the authors 
omit a key aspect of this world-financial  intermediaries. Calvo and Men- 
doza envisage a continuum of “unit-size’’ investors who face fixed costs of 
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ascertaining the facts; this is the way  to make information really costly, 
and all the rest follows. Of course, their model is a parade piece in ex- 
plaining  how in  the real world we  would quickly see the emergence of 
financial intermediaries. 
Financial intermediaries would pool resources from all the unit-size in- 
vestors and, using scale to reduce the costs of information gathering, they 
avoid or sharply reduce the prevalence of Calvo-Mendoza runs. True, in 
their world people should run rather than assume the risk of throwing 
good money after bad  to find out whether the bad news is really bad. 
But once we  include financial institutions that specialize in establishing 
information in a cost-effective way, all this simply goes away. 
There is a second flaw in the paper. In an attempt to catch the theme of 
the day, “contagion,” the paper tries to categorize the simultaneous flight 
of all unit-size investors on learning the rumor as contagion. There is no 
contagion here: Just because everybody does the same thing-correla- 
tion-does  not mean that  some Lotka-style infection is spreading. The 
authors state, “When a rumor suddenly favors another ‘market portfolio’ 
. . . contagion prevails and ‘all investors follow the herd.”’ But this is not 
necessarily so; the investors may simply all be doing the same thing-no 
leader, no follower, nobody egging others on or infecting. 
A third concern regards the finding that globalization is bad. This is a 
surprising result in a microeconomic perspective. Why would market seg- 
mentation dominate, in rigorous welfare assessment, an open world capi- 
tal market? Anyone finding such a result ought to be suspicious unless mar- 
ket failure is patent and remedy is left out of consideration. Globalization 
in the Calvo-Mendoza model means that investors have available low-risk, 
diversified portfolios not including any one particular country-that  is 
why  a policy of  running without further questions is not costly-as  they 
note “the full adverse effect of globalization on information gains is trans- 
mitted with about a dozen countries.,’ 
Somewhere along the line the benefits of diversification disappear and 
the focus is put sharply  on the country that can be dropped  from the 
portfolio without much loss. In this paper,  one reason  not to desert a 
rumor-struck country is poor diversification once it is dropped from the 
portfolio. But if there are many countries in the world, any single country 
becomes dispensable. This is the key  ingredient for the Calvo-Mendoza 
conclusion that globalization is a problem. Having already concluded that 
financial intermediaries are there to develop the useful information on any 
one country, we can safely dismiss the globalization alarm that comes from 
this paper. Diversified portfolios are wonderful for investors and financial 
intermediaries are wonderful in developing useful information essential to 
sound investment; when the two meet we have the best of all worlds. This 
paper does nothing to dismiss the case and, unfortunately, does nothing 
to add to our understanding of financial crises on the periphery. 